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Notes
THE CIVIL JURY IN THE COURTS OF ONTARIO:
A POSTSCRIPT TO THE OSGOODE HALL STUDY
ALLEN M. LINDEN and RICHARD J. SOMMERS*
I. Introduction
The civil jury is under attack in Ontario.1 Bruised and battered by
repeated onslaughts upon its integrity, the jury system is gradually
falling into disrepute. The charges levelled against juries are varied:
because they are easily influenced by emotional appeals, they tend
to find for the plaintiff; because they are plaintiff-minded they tend
to award damages that are too high; because they are laymen, inex-
perienced in the law, the pace of litigation is slowed down. There are
other criticisms as well, in the realm of values, upon which men may
understandably differ, but the main thrust of the attacks have been
factual in nature. In spite of this, these accusations have not been
supported by any empirical data. Nor, surprisingly, have the defenders
of the jury system utilized statistical analysis to refute the charges.2
To be sure, the destiny of the civil jury will be determined ultimately
as a value choice; we must, nevertheless, ensure that we are not
diverted from the main issues by collateral statistical assertions,
especially when they are not buttressed by empirical data.
The reason why the protagonists have not used statistical data
is because none are available in this country. The authors decided to
fill this statistical vacuum in order to illuminate with facts the grow-
ing debate over the future of the jury. If the charges made are borne
out by the facts, the jury would be dealt a severe blow; if, however,
they are demolished by the data, the jury system would receive a
transfusion.
The Report of the Osgoode Hall Study on Compensation for
Victims of Automobile Accidents,3 a broad analysis of the economic
effect of motor vehicle crashes upon individuals, did not cast much
light on the litigation process itself, because so few of the cases
" Allen M. Linden, B.A., LL.M., J.S.D., is a member of the Faculty of
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
Richard J. Sommers, LL.B., is a graduate of Osgoode Hall Law School
and a member of the Ontario Bar.
I See McRuer, The Motor Car and the Law (1966), 4 O.H.L.J. 54; for a
defence see Haines, The Future of the Civil Jury to be printed in SruDiEs IN
CANADIAN TORT LAW (1968).
2 See, for example, the excellent empirical studies of H. Zeisel, H. Kalven
and B. Buchholz, DELAY IN COURT Boston: (1959): and see C. W. Joiner,
CIVL JUSTICE AND THE JURY (Englewood Cliffs N.J.): (1962).
3 A. M. Linden, The Report of the Osgoode Hall study on COMPENsATIoN
FOR VICTIMS OF AUTOMOBILE AccmENTS, Toronto: 1965.
studied reached a trial on the merits.4 Consequently, it was decided to
do a postscript to the Osgoode Hall Study that would focus its atten-
tion on cases that needed trials for resolution. From the files of the
central office of the Supreme Court of Ontario that were made avail-
able to us, we examined all the automobile cases there commenced
in the year 1961 that eventually went to trial. Automobile cases were
chosen for several reasons: the jury is frequently used in this type
of litigation, they are relatively homogeneous cases, there were a fair
number of them, and the results could be compared with the findings
of the Osgoode Hall Study. The year 1961 was selected because most
of the actions would have been completed at the time the fact-gather-
ing began and because the findings would harmonize with the Osgoode
Hall Study.5 As the total number of cases was of manageable propor-
tions, sampling techniques were not necessary. Collecting the required
data was a laborious process that involved a preliminary examination
of the files of about 10,000 actions begun in the year. With the aid
of a simple questionnaire, full information was extracted from the
files of the 121 cases that reached trial. The information collected
consisted of the type of trial, the result, the length of time taken to
reach trial and to complete the trial, the assessment of damages and
other matters. All of this data was coded, key-punched onto I.B.M.
cards and processed on the I.B.M. computers at the Ontario Depart-
ment of Transport. 6 This article is the product of the study.
Before plunging into the data, a brief outline of the jury system
in Ontario may be helpful. 7 Jury trial in Ontario, unlike in the United
Kingdom, is still flourishing, although the size of the jury has shrunk
to six members.8 There are some types of cases, like libel and slander,
that are automatically placed on the jury list unless the parties waive
their right to jury trial9 and others where trial by jury is prohibited
altogether.'0 In most cases, however, either party has the right to
request a trial by jury, which is done by filing a jury notice within
four days after the close of the pleadings." The other party is entitled
to apply to a judge in chambers to strike out the jury notice,'2 which
will be done if he feels the case is too complicated for a jury (as in
a malpractice case) or if the jury is likely to have difficulty remaining
objective (as in a suit against a municipality). The trial judge may,
in any event, strike out the jury prior to beginning the trial or at any
4 Only 8 of the 560 cases studied had a completed trial, Chapter V.
5 Actually not all of the actions commenced in 1961 arose out of accidents
that occurred in 1961, but this was as close as we could come.
6 The assistance of the Department and Mr. Frank Brence, in particular,
is gratefully acknowledged.
7 See generally, SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA,
JURY TRIALS (1959).
8 The agreement of five is necessary for a decision, see the Judicature
Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 197, s. 61(1).
9 Id., s. 55.
10 Id., s. 56.
11 Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 197, s. 58.
12 See Grossberg, Striking out the Jury, SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE LAw
SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA (1959) at 261.
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time during the trial, for example, if insurance is mentioned. 3 Under
these general principles, juries decide around one-half of all the
automobile cases tried in the County of York.' 4 Let us now look at the
results of the trials to see whether juries evince any bias. Next we
shall examine the assessments of damages by juries as compared with
those done by judges. After this, a study of the problem of delay will
be undertaken and, lastly, some conclusions will be offered.
II. The Result of Trials
Critics of the civil jury charge that it is biased in favour of the
plaintiff and, consequently, the defendants do not get a fair hearing.
This allegation is not borne out by the facts. Table I shows that, al-
though the jury decided wholly in favour of the plaintiff in 48.6 per
cent of the cases studied, the trial judges alone found completely in the
plaintiffs favour 71.7 per cent of the time, indicating a more marked
inclination on the part of judges to favour the plaintiff, contrary to
what has been charged. When one studies the dismissals, however, this
trend is modified, for judges alone tended to dismiss law suits more
readily than juries did; judges exonerated the defendant in 18.8 per
cent of the cases, while juries did so only in 2.7 per cent of the
cases they decided.
TABLE I
THE RESULT OF JURY TRIALS COMPARED WITH NON-JURY TRIALS
Type of For Apportionment Apportionment Case
Case Plaintiff Plaintiff 1-50% Plaintiff 51-99% Dismissed TotalWholly At Fault At Fault
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Jury 18 48.6 11 29.7 7 18.9 1 2.7 37 99.9
Non.Jury 38 71.7 3 5.6 2 3.7 10 18.8 53 99.8
It is in the treatment of contributory negligence that one of the
main distinctions between judge and jury trial is demonstrated; judges
rarely apportion negligence, whereas juries do so frequently. Liability
was split in 48.6 per cent of the jury trials, but only in 9.3 per cent
of the judge trials. This indicates that judges have hardly taken notice
of the comparative negligence legislation which permits liability to be
divided, feeling themselves able to decide completely one way or the
13 Id.
14 61 jury cases and 60 non-jury cases were completed out of the actions
commenced in 1961.
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other on the facts. The jury is less confident of its own powers and
chooses rather to divide responsibility between the two parties, a
practice that may well accord better with the true position with
regard to blameworthiness. This willingness on the part of juries to
reduce the awards of plaintiffs shows a lack of bias on their part. As
another consequence, however, plaintiffs before juries receive some
reparation in 97.2 per cent of the decisions, while those before judges
do in 81 per cent of the cases. This indicates that the jury system does
in fact assist to broaden the incidence of tort recovery, but these
payments are often reduced in amount because of comparative negli-
gence. Indeed, if the jury trial were jettisoned, the laudable objective
of the Negligence Act would be severely undermined, since judges
seem so reluctant to avail themselves of it.
Ill. The Assessment of Damages
Opponents of the jury system contend that juries are too generous
in the amount of damages they award, but seldom do they consider
that newspapers print these stories about large awards only because
they are so rare. In fact juries tended to assess damages at very small
figures more often than judges. Table II demonstrates that in 31.7
per cent of their cases juries calculated damages at under $3,000
while judges alone went this low in only 26.1 per cent of their cases.
At the other end of the scale, both juries and judges appeared to
agree; assessments over $25,000 occurred in 11.4 per cent of all jury
cases studied and in 11.6 per cent of non-jury cases, an almost iden-
tical pattern. In the middle ranges, however, juries seem more gener-
ous than judges; 38.2 per cent of the jury assessments fell between
$7,000-$25,000, while only 24.5 per cent of the judge assessments
were within this range; 18.5 per cent of all the jury assessments
were between $3,000-$7,000. Whereas 37.6 per cent of the non-jury
ones were in this category. In other words, juries appear to be assess-
ing damages more liberally in the middle ranges, but less generously
in the lower ranges, because the largest group of jury assessments
was between $7,000-$25,000, while the biggest group of non-jury
assessments were between $3,000-$7,000. However, one must not lose
sight of the fact that these are only assessments of damages, not
awards. It will be recalled that juries are more prone to dividing
responsibility than judges, so that many of their higher damage
assessments may emerge ultimately as lower damage awards. These
figures should, therefore, lay to rest the unfounded accusation that
juries are always too generous. Counsel for defendants must be aware
of this, because it was they who served 53 per cent of the jury notices
in the Supreme Court cases awaiting trial in Toronto where the notice
was filed in 1966.
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TABLE II
ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES
(JURY CASES COMPARED VTH NON-JURY CASES)
Assessment Under $3,000 $3,000-$7,000 $7,000-$25,000 Over $25,000 Total
Jury Cases 31.7% 18.5% 38.2% 11.4% 99.8%
Non-Jury Cases 26.1% 37.6% 24.5% 11.6% 99.8%
IV. Delay
Another recurring complaint about jury trials is that they take
too long to get to trial and that these trials last longer than non-jury
trials. This study sought to obtain data to verify or disprove these
charges of delay in court.
(a) The Waiting Period
The length of time between the issuance of the Writ of Summons
and the commencement of the trial is actually shorter in jury than in
non-jury cases. Table III discloses that 19.6 per cent of the jury trials
were heard in less than a year, but only 15 per cent of non-jury cases
were heard in this short period. In all the other longer categories the
jury trial percentage was smaller than the non-jury percentage:
52.4 per cent of jury trials compared with 53.3 per cent of non-jury
trials were reached in the period 1-2 years; 22.9 per cent of jury
cases compared with 25 per cent of the non-jury trials were heard in
the period 2-3 years; 4.9 per cent of the jury trials compared with
TABLE III
THE WAITING PERIOD
(TIME TAKEN FROM ISSUANCE OF WRIT TO
START OF JURY TRIALS COMPARED WITH NON-JURY TRIALS)
Time Required Less than
To Start Trial 1 year 1-2 years 2-3 years 34 years Total
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Jury Cases 12 19.6 32 52.4 14 22.9 3 4.9 61 99.8
Non.Jury 9 15 32 53.3 15 25 4 6.6 60 99.9
Cases I____
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6.6 per cent of the non-jury trials were begun in the period 3-4 years.
Thus, rather than taking longer to be heard, jury trials in Ontario
are reached a little sooner than non-jury cases. Although this may
explode the criticism made about delay in jury cases, it does not go
much further; the time taken to reach the court-room door is a
function, inter alia, of the number of judges available, rather than
the type of tribunal that hears the dispute. Consequently, if jury
trials were reached more slowly an increase in the number of jury
courts would remedy the delay problem and vice versa. After examin-
ing these figures, one cannot escape the conclusion that an infusion
of additional judicial resources to both jury and non-jury trials in
Ontario is indicated.
(b) Duration of Trial
Once the trial gets under way, a jury trial does tend to take
longer to dispose of than does a trial by judge alone. Table IV demon-
strates that, while only 5.5 per cent of the jury cases are disposed of
in one day or less, 35.5 per cent of non-jury cases are completed in
TABLE IV
DURATION OF TRIAL
(TIME TAKEN TO COMPLETE JURY TRIALS
COMPARED WITH NON-JURY TRIALS)
Length 1 Day 2 Days 3 Days 4 Days 5 Days Total
f Trial or Less
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Jury
Cases 2 5.5 21 58.3 9 25 3 8.3 1 2.7 36 99.
onjuy 16 35.5 17 37.7 10 22.2 2 4.4 0 0 45 99.
this time period.15 The chance of a non-jury trial being over in one
day, therefore, is about six and one-half times as good as in a jury
case. A similar pattern emerges in the other time classifications:
58.3 per cent of the jury cases took 2 days but only 37.7 per cent of
the judge trials took this long; 25 per cent of jury trials required 3
days to be disposed of but only 22.2 per cent of judge trials took
this long; 8.3 per cent of jury cases took 4 days, but only 4.4 per cent
of non-jury trials lasted this long; 2.7 per cent of jury trials went 5
days, but no non-jury case lasted that long.
A more meaningful comparison, however, may be made by
examining the average length of time taken by a jury trial and a
15 Because of the state of the records any lpart of a day was counted as
one day.
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non-jury trial. The average time needed to conclude a jury trial was
2.4 days, whereas the average length of time needed to finish a non-
jury case was only 1.9 days, a difference of .5 days. Consequently,
jury trials definitely do take longer to be tried, but, when one looks
at the total judicial resources involved, this extra time becomes in-
significant. To illustrate this, if the 61 cases arising out of all the
1961 claims in the Supreme Court in Toronto were tried by a judge
alone instead of with a jury, 30.5 judge days would have been saved.
There are, of course, other expenses as well, but future attacks on
the jury can hardly rest on this data.
V. Conclusion
After an examination of the factual data, the inescapable conclu-
sion to be drawn is that they do not support most of the criticisms of
the jury system. Rather than finding in favour of the plaintiff all of
the time, the jury holds completely in his favour less often than
does the judge alone. It is true, however, that the jury is less likely
than a judge to dismiss an action altogether, tending instead to
apportion liability more frequently than judges. Nor does the jury
consistently assess higher damages than judges; indeed, juries bring
in more small assessments and the same number of large ones. In the
intermediate ranges juries do seem to be more generous, but this
tendency must be viewed in the light of the increased use of appor-
tionment in jury trials. On the question of delay in getting to trial,
jury trials are no slower than non-jury trials in this respect; actually
trials by jury are reached slightly more rapidly than those without a
jury. One complaint was proved correct; a longer time period is
necessary to try a jury case, an average of one-half of a day. However,
if all jury trials were abolished the total saving to the County of York
would be thirty and one-half Supreme Court judge days. In other
words, the cost of jury trial in judge days is so insignificant that
one need hardly consider it. There are, of course, other costs in jury
trials and value choices to be assessed as well, but these are not so
easily measured. In the future, however, those who wish to jettison
the civil jury trial will have to search elsewhere for ammunition, for
the factual data here assembled will afford them only slight comfort.
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